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The Transposal Processes of the EC 
Directives and the U.S. Uniform Codes: A 
Comparative Analysis 
Mary Jane Dundas,* Barbara Crutchfield George** 
and Jane Elizabeth Hallas*** 
INTRODUCTION 
A similarity exists between the European Community (EC) 1 and the 
United States in their respective methods of transposing proposals into 
law in order to meet legislative objectives. The process by which the 
EC Commission and the CounciF drafts and issues directives to the 
Member States closely resembles the way in which the U.S. National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National Con-
ference) drafts and proposes uniform laws to state legislatures. The 
major similarity between the directives and uniform laws is that both 
are issued for the purpose of harmonizing the laws among Member 
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1 The European Community (EC) is the supranational entity with the legislative power operat-
ing within the European Union (EU). 
2 The TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11, art. 235, [hereinafter EEC TREATY], enables the Council to legislate on the basis of 
a European Commission proposal after consulting the Parliament in order to achieve a Treaty 
objective. See RICHARD OWEN, EssENTIAL EuROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAw 70 (1995). See infra notes 
62-65, and accompanying text. The EEC Treaty was amended in 1992, and changed the EEC to 
the EC. However, to avoid reader confusion, throughout the paper the authors will refer to the 
Treaty as the EEC Treaty. The EEC Treaty, commonly referred to as the Treaty of Rome, has been 
amended several times including various acts of accession admitting new Member States to the 
EC. 
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States in the EC and among the states in the United States. The major 
difference between the EC and the United States is that while it is 
mandatory for each Member State to implement the directive3 (unless 
there is a pre-existing State law which satisfies the directive's objec-
tives), adoption of National Conference proposals by the states is 
purely voluntary. 
First, the authors review the sovereignty issues that the EC faces with 
its Member States and the historic constitutional issues of states' rights 
in the United States. Second, there is an examination of the process 
and implementation of directives by the EC and the methods employed 
by the National Conference to implement uniform legislation among 
the states. Lastly, there is a comparative analysis of the harmonization 
processes of the EC and the National Conference which summarizes 
the relevant issues previously discussed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. EC: The Treaty Authority Establishing Directives as a Legislative 
Concept 
The European Union (EU) has a political structure unique in the 
world because it is composed of fifteen nations4 that are bound to-
gether by a series of treaties and their amendments. The three main 
treaties, known collectively as the Founding Treaties, include the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC) ,5 the European Atomic 
Energy Community Treaty (Euratom),6 and the European Economic 
Community Treaty (EEC).7 These three treaties were followed by a 
3 Each Member State has discretion regarding form and method of implementation within a 
specific time frame. 
4 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The following countries have 
been invited to begin membership negotiations in 1998: Cyprus, Estonia, The Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. On a slower negotiation track are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Slovakia. See Barry James, Turkey is Rejected for EU Membership, INT'L HER. TRIB., 
Dec. 15, 1997, at 10. 
5 1'REATY EsTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN CoAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY]. The ECSC Treaty is commonly referred to as the Treaty 
of Paris. The purpose of the ECSC Treaty is to create a common market for coal and steel 
products. See OWEN, supra note 2, at 2. 
6 TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 297 
U.N.T.S. 259 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY). The purpose of the EURATOM TREATY is to create 
a specialist market for atomic energy, distribute it through the community, develop nuclear 
energy, and sell surplus. See OWEN, supra note 2, at 3. 
7 See EEC TREATY. 
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series of revising treaties,8 the most recent of which was the Treaty of 
the European Union (TEU) in 1992.9 
Widespread confusion exists regarding the terminology used to de-
note the European structure after the adoption of the TEU. The term 
"European Union" is the product of the TEU, born of a need to have 
a separate designation for the political entity arising out of the three 
main treaties that were modified but not replaced by the TEU. 10 All 
the citizens of the Member States are now citizens of the EU. The EU, 
however, does not have sovereign powers. 
The EU consists of three pillars. The basis for the first pillar was 
created in 1967, when the three European Communities (ECSC, Eur-
atom, and the EEC) were compressed into one by the Merger Treaty.U 
The TEU in 1994, formalized the first pillar and created two new 
pillars. Under the TEU, the first pillar became the newly named EC, 
from the original EEC. The remaining two pillars arose out of areas 
which the Member States were unwilling to incorporate into the EC: 
(1) Common Foreign Mfairs and Security Policy and (2) Justice and 
Home Mfairs.12 Thus, a structure was created through which the EU 
identity could be asserted and economic and social programs pro-
moted. 
The EC,13 derived from the EEC Treaty of 1957, and unlike the EU, 
has some sovereign powers and is the established supranational entity, 14 
8 The Revising Treaties include the TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Apr. 8, 1965, OJ. (L 152) 1 (1967) (entered into 
force July 1, 1967), commonly referred to as the Merger Treaty [hereinafter Merger Treaty] and 
SINGLE EuROPEAN AcT, Feb. 12, 1986, OJ. (L 169) 1 (1987) (entered into force July 1, 1987) 
[hereinafter SEA]. In addition, there are Budgetary Treaties of 1970 and 1975 and the Treaties 
of Accession for each subsequent new Member State (other than the original founding States). 
9 TREATY ON EuROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (official English text), 31 l.L.M. 
247 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter TEU]. This has commonly been referred to 
as the Maastricht Treaty or Maastricht Agreement. See Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and 
Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement, 42 lNT'L & CaMP. L.Q. 213, 213 (1993); Heinrich 
Kirschner, The FramewMk of the European Union Under the Treaty of Maastricht, 13 J.L. & CoM. 
233, 233 (1994). The TEU, which includes the EEC Treaty, is a treaty of attribution allowing the 
EU to act only within the stated powers. No residual powers exist. 
10 The term European Union has political significance, the exact scope of which is not yet fully 
determined. See P.F.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAw 3-7 (6th ed. 1995). 
11 See generally Merger Treaty, supra note 8. 
12 The latter two pillars are intergovernmental in character and are not subject to European 
Community Law. See Bernd Meyering, lntergovemmentalism and Supranationality: Two Stereotypes 
fM a Complex Reality, 22 EuR. L. REv. 221, 221-22 (1997). 
l3 The EEC absorbed the ECSC and EuRATOM in the Merger Treaty, supra note 8. 
14 A supranational entity has the power to make decisions that are binding on members even 
if some members disagree. See BRUCE RussETT & HARVEY STARR, WoRLD Pouncs: THE MENU 
FOR CHOICE 57 (1989). 
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as contrasted with an international entity, through which the Member 
States enact community legislation. Thus, it is incorrect to refer to EU 
law because the EU is the political entity and is separate and distinct 
from the EC. 
The Founding Treaties comprise the primary law while Article 189 
of the EEC Treaty15 briefly sets out the effect of the secondary legisla-
tion which is comprised of directives, regulations, and decisions. 16 
While regulations are binding in their entirety and directly applicable 
in all Member States, 17 directives are binding only as to the result _to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but 
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 18 
Decisions are binding upon those Member States to whom they are 
addressed, principally in anti-competition actions, and recommenda-
tions and opinions have no binding force at all. 19 
The most common form of EC legislation are directives. Directives 
only take effect within a Member State by virtue of national implemen-
15 The legal basis for the issuance of directives was initially established in the EEC Treaty in 
1957, in which Article 100 sets forth that: 
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue 
directives for the approximation of such provisions of the Member States as directly 
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market .... 
EEC 'TREATY, art. 100. 
Article 189 of the EEC Treaty provides: 
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, ... 
the Council and the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, [and] take 
decisions .... A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods. 
/d. at art. 189. 
16 It is referred to as secondary legislation because authority is derived from the Founding 
Treaties. See supra notes 5-7. 
17 The primary EC Jaw is the combination of the three treaties and their amendments estab-
lishing the original communities, ECSC, Euratom and EEC. Although the authors are concen-
trating on one area of secondary law, directives, other sources of the secondary law include the 
regulations and decisions that are viewed as implementing and complimenting the Treaties. 
These are often referred to as Obligatory Acts. See DoMINIK LAsoK & KAROL P.E. BRIDGE, LAW 
AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EU 112-13 (1994). Regulations may also be directly effective if they 
meet the criteria set forth in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105. 
18 See EEC TREATY, art. 189(B). Under the ECSC Treaty, recommendations correspond to 
directives. See ECSC TREATY, art. 14; STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CAsEs & MATERIALS ON EC LAw 31 
(1996). 
19 See EEC TREATY, art 189; OWEN, supra note 2, at 16. 
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tation. Implementation is mandatory, however, where no prior legisla-
tion exists.20 Article 2 of the amended EEC Treaty first sets out the 
objectives of the EC, namely the establishment of a common market, 
economic union, and a range of common policies.21 In order to achieve 
these objectives, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty (otherwise known as the 
Good Faith Clause) states that "[Member States shall] take all appro-
priate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment 
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action 
taken by the institutions of the Community. "22 Because each Member 
State has the authority to tailor its national legislation to meet the 
Community promulgated objective, the concept of directives creates 
freedom within boundaries, and allows for cultural diversity in the 
establishment of laws within unique nations. 
B. United States: The Origination of the Concept of Uniform Codes 
In the United States, no equivalent state governmental legislative 
process, as developed in the EC, exists. Instead, a voluntary procedure 
was developed in 1892 to achieve harmonization of the state laws. 23 An 
informal procedure was necessary because of constitutional prohibi-
tions of a federalist form of government. American federalism is a form 
of political organization in which the exercise of power is divided 
between two levels of government, each having the use of those powers 
as a matter of right and each acting on the same citizen body. Under 
the U.S. Constitution, the powers specifically delegated to the federal 
government are delineated. 24 The residual power of the states to gov-
ern is set forth in the Tenth Amendment. 25 No Constitution or federal 
2o See josephine Steiner, Coming to Terms with EEC Directive, 106 LAw Q. REv. 144, 145 (1990). 
2! See EEC TREATY, arts. 3, 3a, amended by TEU. 
22EEC T'REATY, art. 5. 
23 The passage of the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, with its resulting reservation 
of powers to the States, created the inevitable situation of "diverse legislative enactments by 
different states upon the same subjects." WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, j., A CENTURY OF SERVICE, A 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY oF THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE oF CoMMISSIONERS oN UNIFORM STATE 
LAws 12-13 (1991) [hereinafter A CENTURY OF SERVICE]. Because the problem of lack of 
uniformity among state laws had to be solved, some states established commissions to deal with 
the problem. See id. at 11, 19. A resolution was passed at the 1889 American Bar Association 
(ABA) annual meeting that instructed the President of the ABA to appoint a special Committee 
on Uniformity of State Legislation to examine the "desirability of uniformity in the laws of several 
states." /d. at 18. Prior to the 1892 annual meeting of the ABA, twelve state Commissioners met 
to form what is now the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See id. 
at 11. 
24 See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
25U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
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statute restrictions exist that prevent the states, within the boundaries 
of their authority, from passing widely divergent and conflicting legis-
lation, nor does any governmental mechanism exist to assist the states 
in harmonizing their laws. 
It was necessary to solve the sensitive issue of convincing state legis-
latures to adopt identical or similar laws to achieve harmonization. The 
National Conference was established to propose uniform laws in areas 
where interstate interaction frequently occurred.26 State legislatures, at 
their option, can elect to implement the uniform codes through their 
own legislative process so that the uniform laws become a part of the 
statutory law of the state.27 In many cases, state legislatures choose to 
modifY the uniform laws as originally proposed, or may reject the 
proposed drafts. Each state has discretion regarding form and method 
of implementation of the prototype legislation if and when it chooses 
to adopt the proposed legislation. 
II. THE EC DIRECTIVE MODEL 
A. Sovereignty Disputes 
It is difficult to explain the rationale behind the institutional struc-
ture of the EU or the legal system adopted by the EC without reviewing 
the historical context from which they evolved.28 The separate king-
doms within Europe struggled for centuries to establish their own 
unique identities. Ultimately, they evolved from kingdoms into nation 
26 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, 1997-98 REFER-
ENCE BooK 6 (1997) [hereinafter REFERENCE BOOK]. 
27 See A CENTURY oF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 3, 13. 
28 The EU faces sovereignty issues that can be traced back to the Middle Ages and the Italian 
style of diplomacy. In the fifteenth century, the Italian peninsula was dominated by five major 
states, among which were scattered several smaller, very vulnerable ones. For twenty years, the 
dominant independent states had been involved in intermittent power struggles, tenuous alli-
ances, and destructive wars that inevitably ended in stalemate, while the smaller ones remained 
"precariously preserved by the mutual jealousies of their bigger neighbor states." GARRETT 
MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMACY 67 (1988). Contemporary Italians began to think of Italy 
"as a system of independent states coexisting by virtue of an unstable equilibrium which it was 
the function of statesmanship to preserve." /d. at 71. It was because of this unstable balance and 
interstate competition that forced the Italian statesmen to develop a workable style of diplomacy 
which was essentially a new institution of interstate cooperation to check the overweening 
aspirations of neighboring states. See id. at 52. The Most Holy League was drafted in 1454, an 
essentially military treaty, but it failed to prevent more wars. What is significant about the 
development of diplomacy in Italy in the fifteenth century is that it provided the small scale model 
for "organizing interstate relationships which [all] of Europe later adopted." /d. at 60. 
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states through political, social and economic circumstances. As impe-
rial aspirations, accompanied by an increased chauvinistic attitude, 
grew among the more dominant European countries, an increase in 
political tensions and ultimately destructive wars erupted from which 
a determined sense of nationalism became a pervasive part of the 
European mentality. 29 Thus, it is apparent that those who initially 
conceived of an idea of basing a unified economic community on a 
series of treaties, found it difficult to develop a compatible legal system. 
Given Europe's history, those involved with articulating the terms of 
the treaty were faced with the problem of developing a legal structure 
which would not appear to supersede or interfere directly with the 
sovereignty of these fiercely independent nations. 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed escalating 
conflict between the Catholic and Protestant states of Europe, which 
resulted in the signing of numerous, tenuous, constantly shifting alli-
ances between them. 30 The instability of these alliances, and the fact 
that each state was ultimately only interested in its own aggrandize-
ment31 resulted in a succession of costly wars that ended with the Treaty 
ofWestphalia in 1648.32 Mter over a century of conflict, "the European 
state system had reached a stage of heterogeneous organization of 
precarious equilibrium. "33 With the Peace of Westphalia, "a new Euro-
pean community took shape and a European law of nations was for-
mulated. "34 Ultimately, this innovative scheme failed to prevent sub-
sequent wars, because, what contemporaries had not yet come to terms 
with was that there could be no lasting peace as long as the notion of 
statehood remained the same: a law unto itself, "acknowledging no 
superior and no law more potent than that of its own interests."35 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a militant nation-
alism began to take root all across Europe in reaction to the aggressive 
pretensions of rival nations.36 It was strong nationalistic sentiment that 
ultimately triggered the First World War.37 The destruction that re-
29 See id. at 254. 
30 See MICHAEL NEWMAN, DEMOCRACY, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EuROPEAN UNION 15 (1996). 
31 See MATTINGLY, supra note 28, at 77. 
32 ld. at 178. 
33 !d. 
34 HANS A. ScHMITT, THE PATH TO EuROPEAN UNION 8 (1962). 
35 See MATTINGLY, supra note 28, at 254. 
36 See id. at 4-5. 
37 The first World War was triggered when Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of 
Austria-Hungary, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated in Sarajevo, Bosnia, 
in 1914. See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 33. 
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suited shocked the world, and plans for uniting the desolate continent 
once again emerged.38 The man credited with articulating the idea of 
a "United States of Europe" after World War I, was Count Coudenhove 
whose aim was "to ensure a modicum of peace and order and to 
produce among the nations of Europe an expanding opportunity for 
achieving a more dynamic economy than that afforded by existing 
systems of nationalistic commercial policy. "39 There was a very clear 
military and financial imperative to Coudenhove's proposal. 
The hardship that followed the end of World War I, however, only 
served to strengthen the prevailing notions of nationalism. The puni-
tive terms of the Treaty ofVersailles inflicted humiliation and financial 
ruin upon Germany.40 These harsh terms gave rise in Germany to a 
fanatical belief in nationalismY The Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler even-
tually took the reins of the German government. 42 The actions by the 
German government led to World War II and the ultimate defeat of 
Germany. Once again, a war had killed millions of people and inflicted 
billions of dollars of damage across Europe. 
Mter World War II, Europeans became more amenable to the idea 
of a united Europe, and the first hesitant steps were taken at The 
Hague in 1948.43 From the very beginning, however, there was a power 
struggle between the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of 
Ministers,44 because of the inherent fear of investing power in a Euro-
pean parliament. Parliaments since the seventeenth century had grad-
ually come to be perceived as sovereign bodies with the legislative 
powers to enact laws.45 With this traditional frame of reference, Euro-
pean leaders were wary of vesting control in a representative body 
whose policies would affect all of the community.46 This fear of relin-
quishing control to a federal body intensified, "as governments re-
placed resistance organizations in the liberated areas, [and] restora-
tion of national sovereignty supplanted war-torn notions of European 
38 See ScHMITT, supra note 34, at 9. 
39 AR.'IOLD j. ZURCHER, THE STRUGGLE TO UNITE EUROPE 1940-1958 3 (1958). 
40 See ScHMITT, supra note 34, at 19-23. 
41 See ZURCHER, supra note 39, at 8. 
42 See ScHMITT, supra note 34, at 8. 
43 See id. at 39. 
44 See id. at 40. 
45 See LAWRENCE STONE, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 52 (1996). 
46 See NEWMAN, supra note 30, at 24. 
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unity. "47 In effect, Europeans were again seeking security through their 
own unique national identities.48 
The EU has been perceived as an "embryonic federation."49 Feder-
alists in the EU face ingrained perceptions of sovereignty that are 
difficult to overcome; federalism "constitutes a direct attack upon the 
community's Member States."50 It is essential that the EU be considered 
as distinctive in its own right, and not "as a new unitary state in the 
making."51 It should be seen as a supranational, rather than as an 
international, entity in order to preserve each Member State's secure 
knowledge in its own sovereignty.52 A long history of mutual distrust, 
as well as a notion of sovereignty which was "rooted in the experience 
of traditional state-building and national integration,"53 is largely re-
sponsible for contributing to the complex manner in which secondary 
legislation is implemented. 
B. Institutional Structure of the European Community 
Article 4 of the EEC Treaty created a quadripartite institutional 
system consisting of the European Commission, 54 the Council of Min-
isters55 (the Council of the European Union), the European Parlia-
47 See ScHMITT, supra note 34, at 33. 
48 See Reginald Dale, Stereotypes: A European's Rnad Map, INT'L HER. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1997, at 
13. 
49NEWMAN, supra note 30, at 15. 
50 MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: PoLITICAL IDEAS, INFLUENCES AND 
STRATEGIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1972-1987 14 (1989). 
51 /d. at 18. 
52 See id. at 14. 
53 /d. 
54 See EEC TREATY, art. 4. The European Commission is the executive body and has historically 
had the right of legislative initiative. The TEU granted the European Parliament the authority to 
request that the Commission submit proposals under certain circumstances. The Commission 
consists of unelected commissioners from each Member State, with larger nations, such as 
Germany and United Kingdom, each having two Commissioners and the smaller states each 
having one. See id. at art. 157(1). It must act within the powers conferred upon it in Article 4(1) 
of the EEC Treaty. General powers, however, are granted in Article 235 of the EEC Treaty to 
initiate legislation if it is necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market. See J.S. 
Davidson, The Treaty on European Union or A Guided Tour of Maastricht, 5 CANTERBURY L. REv. 
102, 106 (1992). 
55 The Council of Ministers is the main policy-setting body. It consists of representatives from 
the government of each Member State. The presidency of the Council rotates among the Member 
States every six months. See Merger Treaty, supra note 8, art. 2; EEC TREATY, art. 146. The Council 
acts on proposals of the Commission and its main function is legislative. The Council may not 
act without a proposal for legislation having been first presented to it by the Commission. The 
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ment56 and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) .57 The ECJ plays a 
crucial role in enforcing Community law, being the final arbiter of the 
meaning of Community provisions under Article 177 (the preliminary 
reference procedure).58 The TEU added the Court of Auditors.59 This 
system is different from other national and international models be-
cause it embodies the idea of a true Community of Nations both in 
letter and in spirit. Unlike the United States, the EU is not founded on 
a constitution, but on international treaties among sovereign states.60 
The Member States have relinquished only part of their national sov-
ereignty to these institutions.61 
C. Scope of Authority 
In legislative matters, the EC employs a federal approach through 
the principle of subsidiarity, 52 in which the EC is granted jurisdiction 
Council of Ministers is to be distinguished from the European Council. The European Council 
was formally recognized in Article 2, SEA, but has no formal powers. The function of this political 
body is to set the agenda for progress in the EC and deal with any other broadly political issues 
which might arise. See Davidson, supra note 54, at 105. 
56 The European Parliament does not exercise the role that traditionally would belong to a 
body designated as a "parliament." Initially it was involved in the legislative process only through 
advising and consulting on matters under consideration. Only with the TEU in 1992, did it 
acquire some power. See TEU, art. J (7) . Article J ( 7) allows for Parliament's views concerning many 
policy areas to be taken into consideration. See id. It does not grant additional powers as such. 
See id. It is comprised of elected representatives. See EEC TREATY, art. 137. Seats are allocated to 
reflect the size of Member States' populations. It is the only democratically elected institution 
within the EC. 
57 See EEC TREATY, arts. 164, 169, 170. The Court functions as the primary judicial unit of the 
EC. It exercises jurisdiction over such disputes as actions brought either by the commission or a 
Member State against another Member State for failure to fulfill Community obligations. See id. 
58 See IAN WARD, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION To EUROPEAN LAw, ch. 2 (1996). 
59 See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 231. 
60 See WARD, supra note 58, at ch. 2. 
61 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, [1964) C.M.L.R. 425. 
62 See Conclusions of the Presidency at the Edinburgh European Council Meeting 12-13 
December 1992 (Bull. EC 12-1992). The principle of subsidiarity is an attempt to straddle the 
lines of authority between the Community and Member States. Within the Paragraph 10 of the 
Preamble to the TEU the principle of subsidiarity is first mentioned: "RESOLVED to continue 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions 
are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity." 
Subsidiarity was defined by Title II Article G(B) (5) "Article 3b" of the TEU as: 
In areas which do not full within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale of effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community. 
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for those policies that cannot be effectively handled at the domestic 
level of government. Article 3b of the EEC Treaty states that the 
Community shall act only within its powers which are conferred by the 
Treaty.63 Where the Community does not possess exclusive power, it 
will take action only where the proposed action cannot be achieved by 
the Member States and where the proposed action can be better 
achieved by the Community.64 However, this action shall not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.65 Thus, the 
concept of directives arises to grant the supranational entity the right 
to supply Member States with the templates for laws which must be 
transposed from directives. 
D. Harmonization Procedures 
Part of the process of western European nations working together 
for free trade movement and uniting economic resources into a single 
unit was to work toward the elimination of the disparities among the 
laws of the Member States. 
UnifYing nations through treaties makes it necessary that there be a 
formal process for harmonizing the laws of the Member States.66 Dif-
ficulties arise in handling sensitivities related to respecting the integrity 
of the individual nations.67 Even the terminology is carefully crafted so 
as not to antagonize the leaders and citizens of the independent 
nations firmly rooted in centuries of history and tradition. 
Under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, the European Parliament acts 
jointly with the Council, and the Council and the Commission shall 
issue directives.68 Once a directive has been issued to the relevant 
/d. If a matter falls within the area of the EC's competence defined by the Treaty, then the 
Community has complete jurisdiction. If the matter is within an area of overlapping competen-
cies, subsidiarity requires that it be dealt with internally within the Member States unless the 
States are unable to achieve the objectives or unless the inherent nature of the objectives require 
Community action. Because of the formal nature of the directives, the EC has encountered the 
requirements of the principle of subsidiarity in determining the areas in which the directives can 
be issued. See Davidson, supra note 54, at 112. 
63 See EEC TREATY, art. 3b, amended fry TEU, art. G(3), tit. II. 
64 See id. 
65 See George B. Hefferan, II & Joanne Katsantonis, Movement Towards an Internal Market in 
1993: An Overview of Current Legal Developments in the European Community, 3 DuKE]. CaMP. & 
INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1992). 
66 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 10, at 7-8. 
67 See id. 
68 See EEC TREATY, art. 189; see also LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 16, at 130. 
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Member State, the Member State is obligated69 to transpose it into its 
own national legislation within a set time limit.70 The actual detail and 
method of implementation is left to the Member State, so that its own 
domestic legislation can be amended as appropriate to achieve the goal 
of harmonization described in the directive.71 One directive, therefore, 
may result in a range of differently worded national legislation, but all 
sharing a common objective and some common features. Only when 
a directive precisely specifies a particular course of action will the 
Member State be left with no discretion on the wording of its own 
legislation. 72 Because of the compromising nature of these directives, 
derogations are usually permitted within the terms of the directive. 73 
For example, in the Working Times Directive,74 there are a substantial 
number of derogations available for Member States to utilize.75 
1. Problems of Noncompliance 
Although the EC has supremacy over the national law of Member 
States in the relevant areas,76 Member States do not always comply with 
the provisions of Article 5 in relation to directives. Failures to comply 
include missing the implementation period laid down by the Commu-
nity,77 inadequate implementation of the scope of the directive,78 and 
an outright failure to implement the directive at all. 79 
The consequence of failing to adhere to the terms of the directive 
results in a breach of its Treaty obligations by the Member State.80 No 
69 See EEC TREATY, art. 191(2). 
70 A recent example is the Working Time Directive which stipulated compliance by Member 
States by November 23, 1996 (Council Directive 93/104/EC, art. 18, OJ. (L307) 18 (1993) 
(concerning aspects of the organization of working time)) [hereinafter Working Time Directive]. 
71 See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 122. 
72 See Case 38/77, Enka BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten, 1977 E.C.R. 2203. 
73 See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 123-24. 
74 See Working Time Directive, supra note 70, at art. 17. 
75 See id. 
76 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 
1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105. 
77 See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 125. 
78 See P.P. Craig, Francovich, Remedies and the Scope of Damages Liability, 109 LAw Q. REv. 604, 
604-15 (1993) [hereinafter Craig, Francovich]; Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex 
parte British Telecomm, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1631,1 43; [1996] All E.R. (E.C.) 411, [1996] I.R.L.R. 300. 
Note that in this case the European Court of Justice held there was no serious breach of EC law 
by the British government because the relevant wording contained in the directive article was 
imprecise. 
79 See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 125. 
80 See TEU, art. 5. 
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defense is available to the Member State once the time limit for imple-
mentation has passed.81 The only challenge available is a declaration 
by the ECJ that the directive itselfwas invalid.82 The method ofbringing 
the breach to the Community's attention depends upon whether it is 
another Member State or the Commission bringing enforcement pro-
ceedings,83 or an individual citizen of the EU who seeks to claim his or 
her rights deriving from the directive in question. 
2. Individual Rights Under the Parent Directive 
Of critical importance in determining whether an individual can 
claim rights under a directive which has not been transposed into 
national law by the Member State is whether the directive has direct 
effect (i.e., the directive confers legally enforceable rights on an indi-
vidual).84 In Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ held that a measure (in this 
case, a regulation) will be directly effective if the content is sufficiently 
clear, precise, and unconditional, leaving no room for discretion in its 
implementation. 85 
This decision was followed in VanDuyn v. The Home Office, where 
the ECJ confirmed its adherence to the direct effect doctrine and its 
relevance to directives.86 The ECJ stated that it would be necessary to 
examine in every case "whether the nature, general scheme and word-
ing of the provision in question are capable of having direct effects 
.... "87 In extending the possibility of direct effect to directives, the 
ECJ demonstrated its commitment to protecting the rights of individu-
als. Note that in deciding on the wording of the directive in question,88 
the ECJ in Van Duyn used the words "clearly defined. "89 
8! See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 125. 
82 See id. 
83 See EEC TREATY, arts. 169, 170. It is important to note that the European Court of Justice 
has no power to impose sanctions against Member States under these procedures; they are of 
limited effect in ensuring compliance. See JosEPHINE STEINER, ENFORCING EC LAw 12 (1995). 
84 Vertical direct effect occurs where an individual brings an action within the terms of a 
directive against the state or an emanation of the state. See STEINER, supra note 83, 14-19. 
85 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 
1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105. 
86 See Case 41/74, VanDuyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, '![ 12, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1. 
87 /d. 
88 Directive 64/22/EEC on the CCKJrdination of Special Measures concerning the Movement 
and Residence of Foreign Nationals which are Justified on Grounds of Public Policy, Public 
Security or Public Health, 1963-64 OJ. SPEC. En. (L56) 117. 
89 See Case 41/74, VanDuyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, '![ 19, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1. 
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Furthermore, once the time limit for implementation of the direc-
tive has passed, the directive will no longer be conditional on the 
Member State implementing it into domestic legislation.90 It appears, 
therefore, that an individual wishing to pursue his or her rights under 
a directive will not be able to do so until the implementation period 
has expired.91 
3. Horizontal and Vertical Direct Effect 
The rights of individuals to pursue an action against the Member 
State appear to depend on whether the directive in question has 
vertical or horizontal direct effect.92 Without the ability to enforce 
implementation of directives, Member States would be free to ignore 
directives unless another Member State or the Commission brought 
proceedings.93 Vertical direct effect occurs where an individual brings 
an action, within the terms of a directive, against the state or an 
emanation of the state.94 Horizontal direct effect is where the action is 
brought by an individual against another individual or other private 
body, e.g., a company.95 
Not all national or community law courts have approved the princi-
ple of direct effect in relation to directives. For example, the French 
Conseil d'Etat in Minister of the Interior v. Cohn Bendit refused to follow 
the principle, stating that only regulations under Article 189 were 
capable of having direct effect.96 The Conseil d'Etat stated that the 
authorities to whom the directives were addressed retained the power 
to decide on the form to be given to the implementation of the 
directives and to fix themselves, under the control of the national 
courts, the means appropriate to cause them to produce effect in 
nationallaw.97 
90 See Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629, at 1 22, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 
96. A Member State which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive 
in the prescribed periods may not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the 
obligations which the directive entails. See id. 
91 Note that it is at least arguable that where a Member State has implemented a directive, an 
individual can still commence an action under the parent directive even though the time limit 
has not expired. See JosEPHINE STEINER & LoRNA WooDs, ThXTBOOK ON EC LAw 44 (5th ed. 
1996). 
92 See STEINER, supra note 83, at 14-19. 
93 See STEINER & WooDs, supra note 91, at 44. 
94Jd. 
95 Id. 
96 See Minister of the Interior v. Cohn Bendit (Conseil d'Etat), [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 543, at 1 2. 
97 See id. 
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Many directives have been issued which directly confer individual 
rights,98 not the least of which is the area of employment.99 It is under-
standable that individuals may wish to assert these rights which are 
derived from directives. However, it is surely iniquitous that individuals 
may only do so if they are in the fortuitous position of being employed 
by the state100 or an emanation of the state.101 
As a result of a multiplicity of actions throughout the 1980s and 
continuing in the 1990s, the ECJ appeared to recognize vertical effect, 
but not horizontal direct effect.102 The main argument is that because 
directives are addressed to Member States, it leads to uncertainty if 
private bodies can be sued for what, in fact, is the government's failure 
to legislate to meet the directives aims.103 It is important to note that 
prior to the TEU in 1992, there was no obligation on the EC to publish 
directives, although in practice they were published. 104 
In Marshall v. Southampton Area Health Authority, the ECJ clarified 
its position stating, "a directive may not of itself impose obligations on 
an individual" and "a provision of a directive may not be relied upon 
as such against such a person. "105 This decision was subsequently confir-
med in the Dori case, where the ECJ refused to follow the Advocate 
General's advice to extend direct effect to encompass private parties. 106 
98 See G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution fur Europe, 26 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 
595, 'I 3 (1989). 
99 See Council Directive 75/117 /EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of Member States 
Relating to the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Men and Women, 1975 OJ. (L 
45/19) [hereinafter Equal Pay Directive); Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the Implementation 
of the Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as regards Access to Employment, 
Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions, 1976 OJ. (L 39/40) [hereinafter 
Equal Treatment Directive]. 
100 See Duke v. GEC Reliance Ltd., [1988) App. Cas. 618, 630-40, [1988)1 All E.R. 626 (House 
of Lords). 
101 Case C-188/89, In re Foster and others v. British Gas pic, 1990 E.C.R. I-3313, n 14-22, 
[1991) 2 W.L.R. 258. In Foster, the ECJ laid down the requirements for an organization to come 
within the definition of an emanation of the state. The organization had to be made responsible 
by the State for providing a public service, which was under the control of the state and had 
special powers to carry out this service. Thus in Doughty v. Rolls Royce plc, [1992) 1 C.M.L.R. 
1045, '1'1 25-27, Rolls Royce, which had been owned by the United Kingdom government before 
privatization, did not come within the definition even though elements of the organization 
provided a service. 
102 See LAsoK & BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 130. 
10~ See STEINER & WooDs, supra note 91, at 44. 
104 See id. 
105 See Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton Area Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723,, 48. 
106 See Case C-91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Sri, 1994 E.C.R. I-3325, n 20-25, [1995) 1 
C.M.L.R. 665. 
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Instead, it reiterated the basis of its stance, namely that to give direc-
tives horizontal effect would be akin to making them indistinguishable 
from regulations, thus extending the meaning of Article 189.107 
This adherence to the policy of not allowing horizontal effect ap-
pears to have been challenged recently by the ECJ in CIA Security 
International v. Signalson. 108 This case concerned three private security 
organizations.109 The ECJ held that technical regulations (in this case, 
technical standards for burglar alarms), which are not notified to the 
Commission as required under the relevant directive, cannot be en-
forced against an individual. 110 The logical consequence of this reason-
ing therefore appears to be that a directive can have direct effect and 
be relied upon in national courts by an individual facing an action by 
another individual.m 
If the door to horizontal direct effect wedged open by CIA Security 
is not widened by subsequent ECJ decisions, some areas still exist where 
individuals may assert their rights under directives which are either not 
yet implemented or inaccurately applied into domestic legislation. The 
principle of indirect effect was formulated in Von Colson112 where the 
ECJ stated, "[i]t is for the national court to interpret and apply the 
legislation adopted for the implementation of the directive in conform-
ity with the requirement of community law, insofar as is given discre-
tion to do so under national law. "113 In other words, domestic laws must 
be construed in accordance with the terms of the relevant directive. 114 
The extent to which national courts have to comply with this principle 
has been challenged. 115 In Marleasing, 116 the ECJ confirmed that even 
legislation adopted before the directive in question must be inter-
preted as far as possible in the light of the wording and the purpose 
of the directive in order to achieve its purpose. 117 
107 See EEC TREATY, art. I89. 
108 See Case C-I94/94, CIA Security lnternation v. Signalson, I996 E.C.R. I-220I, 'I 37, [I996] 
All E.R. (E.C.) 557. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
111 See Jason Coppel, The Harizontal Effect of Directives, 26 INDUS. L.J. 69, 70 (1997). 
ll2 See Case I4/83, Von Colson and Kaamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, I984 E.C.R. I89I, 
'l[ 3, [I984] 2 C.M.L.R. 430. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See Case C-106/89, Mar leasing SA v. La Commercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 1990 
E.C.R. I-4I35, 'l[ I7, [I992] I C.M.L.R. 305. 
ll6 See id. 
117 See id. 11 I3. 
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What the ECJ meant by "interpretation" has also been open to 
scrutiny. In Webb v. EMO Cargo, the House of Lords in the United 
Kingdom held that national courts were only obliged to construe 
domestic legislation in light of directives "if at all possible. "118 In other 
words, if the domestic legislation can be construed in accordance with 
the relevant directive, it must be; if not, presumably the national court 
can effectively ignore the directive.119 
Aside from direct effect and the hotly debated principle of indirect 
effect, a system of penalizing recalcitrant Member States has been 
devised, thereby stepping into the breach between two private parties 
caused by the State's failure to implement directives. If an individual 
is able to prove that he or she has suffered loss as a result of the State's 
failure to implement a directive, he or she may be able to claim 
damages from the Member State under the Francovich principle,120 
even if the directive does not have direct effect. 
The ECJ laid down three conditions to be fulfilled for a right to bring 
such an action. 121 First, the result prescribed by the relevant directive 
would entail the grant of rights to an individual. 122 Second, it should 
be possible to identifY the content of those rights within the directive. 123 
Third, there must be a causal link between the breach of the State's 
obligations and the loss and damage suffered by the injured party.124 
The ECJ stated that, "it is a principle of Community law that the 
Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage caused to 
individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held 
responsible. "125 Therefore, Member States have the duty to rectifY the 
"unlawful consequences of a breach of community law. "126 The Member 
State may also be liable for incorrect implementation of a directive.127 
IJ8Webb v. EMOAir Cargo (UK) Ltd., (No.2), [1995] 4 All E.R. 577, 582. (House of Lords). 
IJ9 See Duke v. GEC Reliance Ltd., [ 1988] App. Cas. 618, 630-40; [ 1988] 1 All E.R. 626 (House 
of Lords). 
12° See joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357, 
, 40, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305. It is worth noting that the Italian government had already received 
a judgment from the ECJ under Article 169 for the government's failure to implement the 
directive in question. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357, 
, 37. 
126 /d. 
l27 See id. , 76. 
60 BoSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
In Brasserie du Pecheur, 128 the ECJ considered the nature of the 
breach of EC law which resulted in Member State liability. As is com-
mon, the Court formulated a threefold test: 1) the rule of law im-
pinged must have been intended to confer rights on individuals; 2) 
the breach must have been sufficiently serious;129 and 3) a direct causal 
link between the breach and the damage must have been established.130 
In Dillenkofer, the ECJ confirmed that for liability to attach to the 
Member State, the breach must be sufficiently serious and that, al-
though not expressly stated in the Francovich formula, it was self-evi-
dent from the facts of that case. 131 If there were a breach by a Member 
State of Article 189 once the conditions formulated in Francovich132 are 
satisfied, the state will be liable in damages to the individual. 133 
Thus, an individual denied rights under direct effect (for example, 
because he or she works for a private company rather than the State) 
could mount a claim for damages due to the State's failure to imple-
ment those rights.134 Therefore, it would appear that whenever a direc-
tive gives rights to an individual, such as in employment directives, 
individuals will be able to sue135 provided the conditions in Francovich 
are met.136 Furthermore, a breach by a Member State will impact upon 
all emanations of that Member State.137 
128 See Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany and R v. Secretary of 
State for Transport ex parte Factortame and others, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 889, 
, 65. 
l29 See P.P. Craig, Once More Unto The Breach: The Community, The State and Damages Liability, 
113 LAw. Q. REv. 72, 72-74 (1997). 
13° See Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany and R. v. Secretary of State 
for Transport ex parteFactortame and others, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, [1996] C.M.L.R. 889, '1'1 50--51. 
This reasoning was followed in Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte British 
Telecomm, [1996] All E.R. (E.C.) 411, '1'1 39--40, [1996] I.R.L.R. 300, and Case 5/94, R. v. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 
1-2553, [1996] All E.R. (E.C.) 493, 11 25-26. 
131 See Joined Cases C-179, 188 & 190/94, Dillenkofer eta!. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
1996 E.C.R. 1-4845, [1996] All E.R. (E.C.) 917, U 23-30. 
132 See Cases C-6/90, C-9/90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 
1 40, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305. 
133 See Noel Travers, The Liability of Local Authorities for Breaches of Community Directives by 
Member States, 22 EuR. L. REv. 77, 173 ( 1997). 
134 See Josephine Steiner, From Direct Efficts to Francovich: Shifting Means of Enforcement of 
Community Law, 18 EuR. L. REv. 3, 3-5 (1993). 
135 See T.K. Hervey, Francovich Liability Simplified, 26 INT'L L.J. 74, 75 (1997). 
136 See Equal Pay Directive, supra note 99, at art. 2; Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 99, 
at art. 3. 
137 See Coppel, supra note 111, at 70, 71. 
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III. THE U.S. UNIFORM CoDE MoDEL 
In the United States, there is a two-tier system in which fifty states 
are governed by federal law and state law, with no requirement that 
there be any uniformity of laws among the states for areas which rest 
within their jurisdiction.138 This lack of harmonization among the states 
makes it very difficult for businesses and others who engage in inter-
state transactions. 139 Although the need for harmonization of the laws 
of the states may be important, the uniform code process rests on 
voluntary compliance by the state legislatures. 140 Occasionally, external 
pressures are placed on state legislatures to follow the same pattern of 
law found in other states.141 
A. Sovereignty Disputes 
The United States resorted to the voluntary system of the uniform 
codes for reasons similar to those of the EC for handling its secondary 
legislative process through the issuance of directives. Arguments have 
abounded since the Revolutionary War in the United States about the 
scope of powers of the federal government relative to the states. 142 
Even before the colonies united to declare their independence from 
Britain in 1775, the question of sovereignty had already been raised in 
earlier attempts at collaboration.143 The first attempt to unite the colo-
nies occurred in 1643, when a union was created under the title 'The 
United Colonies ofNew England."144 This union provided a means for 
the independent colonies to show collective support against outside 
aggressors and to facilitate trade between them. 145 The union remained 
in force for thirty years as a confederation rather than as a consolida-
138 See U.S. CaNST. amend. X. 
l39 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 6-7. 
140 Legislatures of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the territories of Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the Virgin Islands must each determine whether a uniform code will be considered 
for adoption. See id. at Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of September, 30, 1997, 
appended on an unnumbered page. 
141 See id. at 6. An example is the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by e~ch of the 
fifty states' legislatures resulting from business community pressures. See id. at Record of Passage 
of Uniform and Model Acts as of September 30, 1997, appended on an unnumbered page. 
l42 See LAURENCE J. O'TOOLE, JR., AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 5 ( 1993). 
143 See A.l.PHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE STATES' RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE 
CoNSTITUTION 8 (1964). 
144 RoBERT j. TuRNBULL, OBSERVATIONS ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY, FEDERAL USURPATIONS, AND 
STATE INTERPOSITION 9 (New York, Cornish Lamporti & Co., 1850). 
145 See id. at 9. 
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tion, since each colony retained absolute jurisdiction over its separate 
territories.146 At the termination of the union, the colonies remained 
independent until the notorious incident of the Stamp Act in 1765, at 
which point each colony agreed to send a delegate to Philadelphia 
annually to confer in the interests of the colonies as a whole. 147 Again, 
the structure was confederate in nature, and the colonies retained 
absolute sovereignty.148 
The Declaration of Independence in 1776, altered the nature of the 
union because the colonies became states; however, each state still 
jealousy guarded its independent status. 149 "The strongest evidence of 
its confederate character was the inability of the General Government 
to act upon the people of the states otherwise than through the 
authority of the state legislature. "150 The Articles of Confederation were 
subsequently abandoned in 1787, and a new Constitution was framed, 
but the ideological debate over the states' versus the federal govern-
ment's rights continued.151 
In the early years of the nineteenth century, United States Supreme 
Court Chief Justice John Marshall defined the Constitution in terms 
favorable to the federal government, arguing that the states abrogated 
their sovereignty by uniting together.152 His successor, Roger Brooke 
Taney, however, interpreted the Constitution along the lines of dual 
federalism, in which "two authorities confront each other as equals 
across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdic-
tions, "153 and he ruled most often in favor of state power. 154 John C. 
Calhoun, moved by the conflict between the North and the South, 
spoke vehemently in defense of state rights, arguing that had the states 
intended to abrogate their sovereignty, they would have explicitly said 
so when the Constitution was originally drafted. 155 "I consider the 
146 See id. at 10. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See TuRNBULL, supra note 144, at 11. 
150Jd. 
151 Id. at 12. 
152 See MASON, supra note 143, at 187. 
153 /d. at 188. Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, 1777-1864; Fifth Chief Justice of the United 
States 1836-1864. 
154 /d. 
155 AUGUST 0. SPAIN, THE PoLITICAL THEORY OF JOliN C. CALHOUN 178 ( 1951) .John C(aldweli) 
Calhoun, 1782-1850, Vice-President, 1825-1832, U.S. Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Sena-
tor, and Congressman. 
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preservation of the rights of the states, as secured by the Constitution, as 
essential to liberty," Calhoun wrote. 156 
Like earlier attempts by European leaders to construct a workable 
confederation, 157 the Framers of the U.S. Constitution sought for a way 
to minimize "instability, injustice and confusion," and to prevent "in-
ternal tyranny. "158 Although the language of the Constitution was am-
biguous, the intention was to allow for the constantly evolving impact 
of political, economic and social forces to shape its interpretation 
without violating the basic framework. For example, in order to over-
come the restrictions placed on national government regarding direct 
participation in state affairs, joint stock companies were organized by 
private and public sectors to finance railways and road construction.159 
In this way, the states could collaborate with the federal government 
in strengthening the infrastructure without compromising the Consti-
tution.160 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, however, federal inter-
vention in state affairs steadily increased.161 The federal income tax was 
imposed in 1913, and grants-in-aid to the states were introduced in the 
1920s to pay for improvements to the infrastructure, which caused 
growing concern that the federal government was becoming overly 
intrusive. 162 A cooperative federalism replaced the dual federalism of 
the nineteenth century.163 The economic, social, and political impera-
tives of the twentieth century began to shape how the states and federal 
government negotiated their separate spheres.164 · 
The United States experienced several distinctive phases that have 
shaped the role of the federal government in determining the degree 
of state rights.165 The first stage lasted from 1789 through 1861, and 
incorporated the notion of dual federalism dominated by a "rivalistic 
state mercantilism. "166 The second stage dated from 1861 through 
156Jd. 
157 See TuRNBULL, supra note 144, at 7. 
158Q'TooLE, supra note 142, at 3. 
159 See id. at 5. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. at 6. 
l62 See id. at 7. 
l63 See Harry N. Scheiber, The Condition of American Federalism: A Histurian 's View, in AMERICAN 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FOUNDATIONS, PERSPECTIVES, AND IsSUES 67, 67 (Laurence 
O'Toole,Jr. ed., 1930). 
164 See id. at 72. 
165 See id. at 67-73. 
166 Id. at 71. 
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1890, a transitional period of increased centralization through the 
jurisdiction of the courts. 167 It was during this period that the Sherman 
Act was passed to regulate interstate business. 168 The third stage cov-
ered the years from 1890 to 1933, in which centralization increased: 
the Supreme Court "censored" state legislation; grants-in-aid became 
even more prevalent; and World War II made national security a pri-
ority.169 The New Deal in 1934, increased both the extent and the 
intensity of federal regulation. 170 And by 1941,Justice Stone redefined 
the Tenth Amendment by inserting the word "expressly" before the 
word "delegated," arguing that the Framers of the Constitution had 
indeed intended to create a strong central government. 171 The debate 
over the extent of states' rights continues to be a highly-charged one, 
as evidenced by anti-federalist sentiments expressed through the pro-
liferation of militia-type organizations that continue to object to the 
authority of central government. 
B. Constitutional Structure 
The United States has two official legislative systems and one un-
official system. The federal government is the first official system. 
Congress is authorized under Article I of the U.S. Constitution to pass 
legislation that 1) pertains strictly to federal matters and 2) legislation 
which affects interstate commerce.172 The second official system is at 
the state level. Each of the several states has a separate legislative body 
authorized under its respective Constitution to adopt legislation con-
cerning strictly intrastate matters. The unofficial voluntary system for 
effecting harmonization of disparate state laws operates through the 
National Conference. 173 
As far back as 1786, immediately prior to the adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution, the drafters of the Constitution considered "how far a 
uniform system in the commercial requirements would be necessary 
to their common interest and their permanent harmony."174 In 1789, 
the Constitution was approved, and by 1791, the first ten amendments 
167 See id. 
168 See ScHEIBER, supra note 163, at 71. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 See MASON, supra note 143, at 190. 
172 U.S. CaNsT. art. I. 
173 Constitution of the National Conference, § 1.2, in REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 79. 
174 Quoted in A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 12 
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had been adopted. The Tenth Amendment states: 'The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple."I75 
One of the difficulties inherent in the reservation of powers by the 
states is the emergence of divergent legislation concerning the same 
subject matter. 176 Over the years, such diverse statutes became a prob-
lem.177 In the nineteenth century, as the nation grew, the disparate 
legislation among the states presented a challenge to a mobile popu-
lation that had moved from local to multi-state activities.178 Political 
pressure mounted to have particular areas of the law harmonized 
among the several states. 179 Given the competitive positions of the states 
and their respective histories, it was unreasonable to rely on state 
legislatures to adopt identical statutory approaches. Voluntary state 
action appeared to be the only solution. In this way, state sovereignty 
was preserved because state legislatures have the discretion to adopt, 
reject, or adopt in part any proposed legislation. 
C. The Harmonization Procedures 
The American Bar Association (ABA),180 formed in 1878, is one of 
the precipitating bodies concerned with creating a solution for filling 
the gap where harmonization of laws among the states is necessary but 
cannot be formally accomplished. 181 The ABA establishes in its consti-
tution as one of its objectives the promotion of the uniformity of 
legislation among the states.182 The National Conference was created 
to develop and propose uniform laws to state legislatures where har-
175 U.S. CaNST. art X. 
176 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 3, 12, 13. 
177 /d. 
178 /d. 
179 /d. 
180 The American Bar Association (ABA) is an influential private organization. See generally, 
ALBERT P. MELONE, LAWYERS, PuBLIC POLICY AND INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 6-8 (1977); THE 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAw & PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, THE ABA IN LAw AND SociAL POLICY: 
WHAT RoLE? (1994). The membership is composed of "any person of good moral character in 
good standing at the bar of a state, territory, or possession of the United States is eligible to be 
a member of the Association in accordance with the Bylaws." AMERICAN BAR AssociATION 
CoNSTITUTION AND BYLAWS, § 3.1 Members, (1996-1997). The ABA has no governmental author-
ity. /d. at § 11.1 Autonomy of State and Local Bar Associations. 
181 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 11-22. 
182 See id. 
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monization of the law in a particular area the Conference thought to 
be important. 183 
1. Role of the National Conference 
In order to promote this goal, the ABA created a Committee on 
Uniform Laws in 1889.184 The Committee convened a study of inter-
state laws that would achieve uniformity. 185 The study group submitted 
a report at the next annual ABA meeting which showed almost unan-
imous agreement that "desired uniformity could be secured best by 
concurrent legislative action in the various states. "186 The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was established 
in 1892.187 
Since its inception, the National Conference has drafted over two 
hundred laws on numerous subjects and various fields of law, many of 
which have been widely enacted. 188 The National Conference recom-
mends both uniform acts and model acts.189 In the 1940s, there was a 
recommendation that the appropriate subject matter for uniform acts 
include matters which are appropriate for state legislation and have 
substantial interstate implication.190 On the other hand, model acts 
cover subjects which "do not directly affect relationships among the 
states, but which involve problems common to many, if not all, the 
states. "191 It is specifically stated by the National Conference that "it 
drafts model legislation on subjects where state legislation could help 
implement international treaties of the United States or where uni-
formity would be desirable. "192 
The members of the National Conference are composed of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws from each state, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Each state usually has at 
183 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 6. 
184 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 20. 
185 See id. 
186 I d. at 21. 
187 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 11. 
188 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 6. Note that although there have been two hundred 
laws drafted, there are only ninety-nine in existence at this time because many have been 
superseded such as the Sales Act and Negotiable Instruments Law which were superseded by the 
Uniform Commercial Code. See id. 
189 See id. at 6-7. 
190 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 67. 
191 REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 6. 
192 Id. at 7. 
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least three commissioners, 193 but each state delegation has only one 
vote. The associate members of the Conference are usually the princi-
pal officers of the state agency charged with the responsibility of draft-
ing legislation for the state. 194 
As is evidenced by the National Conference's organizational plan, it 
is non-partisan association. 195 The state Commissioners actively seek 
consideration of uniform acts, but they do not represent any special 
in terest.196 
The Conference is a state organization.197 The three sources of sup-
port are the state legislatures, the ABA, and foundations. 198 The appro-
priations from state legislatures make up the major portion of its 
financial support.199 The states apportion the expenses based upon 
their population and financial abilities. 200 Individual commissioners 
receive neither salary nor compensation.201 
The President is the chief executive officer of the National Confer-
ence and presides at all meetings. 202 Proposals that uniform acts be 
drafted, received from many sources, are referred to a Committee on 
Scope and Program.203 This committee conducts an investigation, so-
licits input from interested parties, and reports to the National Con-
ference concerning the desirability and feasibility of drafting a uniform 
law on a given subject.204 A special committee of state Commissioners 
is appointed to prepare a draft of an act after the National Conference 
determines that it is an acceptable subject. 205 Draft acts are submitted 
to the National Conference after extensive consideration from as many 
constituencies as possible, including groups within the ABA.206 
The National Conference meets annually to consider drafts of pro-
posed uniform legislation.207 The National Conference must consider 
193No state has less than three. However, there are some states, like California, that have 
thirteen. See id. at 32-53. 
194 Constitution of the National Conference, § 2.3, in REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 79. 
195 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 6. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 7. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 7. 
2°1 See id. 
202 See id. at 87, 93. 
203 See id. at 7. 
204 See id. 
205 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 8. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. at 7. 
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all draft acts section by section at no less than two annual meetings 
before it decides by a vote of states to promulgate the draft as a uniform 
act.208 Each state is entitled to one vote, and an act is not recommended 
unless 1) a majority of the states are represented at an annual meeting 
and 2) at least twenty jurisdictions have approved the draft. 209 
The purpose of the Conference is to promote uniformity in state 
laws on subjects where uniformity is desirable and practicable.210 In 
order to meet this purpose, the Commissioners participate in drafting 
acts on various topics; they then submit the drafts to the states to be 
considered for adoption.211 The most successful uniform law is the 
Uniform Commercial Code which has been adopted by all fifty states. 212 
Every act proposed by the National Conference must conform to the 
following requirements: 
1. There shall be an obvious reason for an act on the subject such 
that its separation will be a practical step toward uniformity of state law 
or at least toward minimizing diversity; 
2. There shall be a reasonable probability that the act, when ap-
proved, either will be accepted and enacted into law by a substantial 
number of jurisdictions or, if not, will promote uniformity indirectly; 
3. The subject of the act shall be such that uniformity of law among 
states will produce significant benefits to the public through improve-
ments in the law or will avoid significant disadvantages likely to arise 
from diversity of state law; 
4. The potential contribution of the proposed act to the objectives 
of the Conference shall be substantial in comparison with other pend-
ing proposals for addition to the agenda of the National Conference; 
5. If consideration of the proposal requires other resources in addi-
tion to the work of members and staff of the National Conference, 
there must be a reasonable prospect that additional resources can be 
found. 213 
2os See id. at 8. 
209 See id. 
210 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 6. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. at Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of September 30, 1997, appended 
on an unnumbered page. 
213 See id. at 100, 101. 
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2. Voluntary Compliance 
Through the evolutionary process, one hundred one uniform acts 
now exist.214 Forty of the uniform acts have been adopted by a majority 
ofthe states.215 Unlike the uniform acts, none ofthe twenty-eight model 
acts has been adopted by such a majority. 216 In fact, no more than 
eleven states have adopted any of the model acts. 217 However, the 
success rate cannot be measured by the number of adoptions, because 
with both the uniform acts and the model codes, legislatures have 
studied the proposed acts and codes and used parts of them as a 
prototype for statutes that have later been passed.218 
It should be noted that states have the discretion to adopt legislation 
which is in the form of an "amended version," "substantially similar" 
or "identical" to that proposed by the National Commissioners.219 For 
example, the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act has been en-
acted verbatim by thirty-one states, substantially similar in ten states, 
and an amended version enacted in eight states.220 
The record of passage of uniform acts as of September 30, 1997, 
published by the National Conference, charts one hundred one uni-
form acts and the states that have either enacted them, adopted an a-
mended version, or implemented a substantially similar law in place.221 
Of the one hundred one acts listed, those that have been enacted most 
often concern child and family issues and business regulation. 222 For 
example, the Uniform Commercial Code, which has undergone nine 
revisions since its inception in 1951, has had as many as fifty-two of the 
fifty-three regions enact it at one time or another.223 All states and 
territories except Massachusetts and Puerto Rico enacted verbatim the 
1968 version of the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act. 224 
214 A full record of passage of uniform acts can be found at Record of Passage of Uniform and 
Model Acts as of September 30, 1997, appended to an unnumbered page at the end of REFERENCE 
BooK, supra note 26. 
215 ld. 
216Jd. 
211 Jd. 
2l8 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 109-10. 
2l9 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of 
September 30, 1997, appended on an unnumbered page. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
224 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of 
September 30, 1997, appended on an unnumbered page. Massachusetts enacted what the Con-
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The uniform acts adopted in the amended form still reflect an 
emphasis on child and family issues.225 For example, the Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was unanimously adopted in the 
amended version. 226 The only other uniform act that was unanimously 
adopted was the Attendance of Out of State Witnesses Act. 227 
The uniform acts that have been least adopted, that is by less than 
three and usually by none at all, do not fall into any particular cate-
gory.228 The Land Security Interest Act is an example of an act that has 
not been adopted in any jurisdiction. 229 The only child-welfare act that 
was not unanimously adopted is the Putative and Unknown Fathers 
Uniform Act.230 What is evident in reviewing the passage pattern of the 
uniform acts is that the states still undeniably observe their right to 
reject or adopt as they see fit, thus emphasizing their continued inde-
pendence. 
3. Effects of Harmonization 
The U.S. system is established in such a way that the concept of 
voluntary adoption of laws by states, as recommended by a completely 
non-political organization, is the preferred way to accomplish some 
degree of harmonization. 231 Because of the disparity in adoptions of 
the uniform codes among the states, there is no guarantee that if a 
uniform code is adopted in a state that it is exactly the same in other 
states. 232 This reality demonstrates the negative aspects of a voluntary 
process.233 A quote from former Commissioner James W. Day speaks to 
this point: 
Certainly everyone connected with the conference is aware 
that its work is not perfect. Particularly it is impossible in 
ference refers to as "substantially similar" legislation. See id. It should be noted that a 1997 version 
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Custody Act exists, but which has not been adopted 
in any form to date. See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of 
September 30, 1997, appended at an unnumbered page. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. 
23! See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 13. 
232 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of 
September 30, 1997, appended on an unnumbered page. 
233 See id. 
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drafting an act to foresee subsequent changes of conditions 
that may affect its desirability at a future period. Many of the 
instances in which a uniform or model act has later been 
amended, superseded by a new act or declared obsolete are 
attributable to this factors. 234 
7l 
Benefits occur as a result of the work of the Commissioners in 
recommending a uniform code for adoption. 235 In discussing these 
benefits, W. Brooke Graves remarked: 
[i]t may be ... that even though the act may not have been 
widely adopted by the states as proposed by the Conference, 
it may still exert considerable influence upon legislation in 
many jurisdictions. It may serve to stimulate needed legisla-
tion in neglected fields, and to discourage unwise legislative 
polices which might otherwise be widely adopted. 236 
IV. CoMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The primary thrust for both the EC and the ABA National Confer-
ence is the necessity for having comparable laws in a geographic region 
in which there is constant interaction among people and businesses. 
The historic issues of sovereignty caused the EC237 and the United 
States238 to develop different methods of dealing with the problem of 
institutional and constitutional structures which prevent them from 
passing laws which apply to all Member States or to all the states. 
Although a historic similarity exists between the United States and 
the EC regarding sovereignty issues, the methods of solving the prob-
lems that arise from these issues differ greatly. The significant differ-
ence is that the EC was created by a series of governing treaties, while 
the United States has a constitutional structure serving as its founda-
tion for a federal form of government. 239 The U.S. Constitution de-
234 A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 106. Note that reference is made to a University 
of Florida article written by Commissioner Day in which this comment was made. 
235 ld. at 109-10. 
236 ld. 
237The EC was created from nations with a long history of war. See DEREK W. URWIN, THE 
CoMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 1945 7 (1991). In the last 
half of the twentieth century, these nations resolved to move from war towards cooperation that 
transcends trade agreements. ld. 
238 The original thirteen states in the last half of the eighteenth century entered into a compact 
and came to a treaty-like agreement to join as one political and legal unit under a single federal 
constitution. See generally U.S. CoNST. 
239 As evidenced by the debate over the euro as the single European currency, the debate 
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dares that the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States 
are the supreme law of the land and are binding on all judges in every 
state.240 The Constitution created the Office of the President, Congress, 
and the federal court system.241 The EC, on the other hand, is not part 
of a federal system and has developed an institutional structure which 
places the three communities under a single Council, Commission, 
Court and Parliament. 242 The EC is only one of the three so-called 
pillars of the EU created by the TEU in 1992, and thus, is forced to 
operate within many restraints on its powers. 243 
While Congress has full powers to pass primary laws244 under a 
federalist system, the founding treaties245 constitute the only primary 
law of the EC. The EC institutions can only issue directives246 as a 
secondary means of legislation, while each of the sovereign European 
nations in the EU has its own independent form of domestic govern-
ment and legislative bodies.247 In the United States, state legislatures 
are vested with the power to pass all laws pertaining to the citizens of 
their states.248 The drafters of the Constitution appear to have made a 
concession to those who advocated states' rights by not addressing 
matters that are strictly intrastate.249 The failure to create a system for 
harmonizing laws among the states caused a gap that the National 
Conference attempts to fill.250 
Both the EC and the United States were left with no alternative 
except to devise ways in which to solve the problem indirectly. As its 
main method of harmonization, the EC uses the institutional mecha-
continues in the EU between the integrationists, who argue for a federal form of government, 
and the nationalists, who seek to protect the independence and sovereignty of their independent 
countries. See Dale, supra note 48, at 13. 
240 See U.S. CoNST. art. VI. 
241 See U.S. CoNST. arts. I, II, Ill. 
242 See Davidson, supra note 54, at 105-{)8. 
245 See OWEN, supra note 2, at 7. 
244 Under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, if powers are not delegated to the 
federal government, and if the powers are not prohibited to the states by the Constitution, the 
states are vested with the power to pass laws pertaining to residents within their boundaries. See 
U.S. CoNsT. amend. X. 
245 See generally EEC 'I'REATY; ECSC 'I'REATY; EuRATOM 'I'REATY. 
246 Directives, along with regulations and decisions, are the means of secondary legislation by 
the EC. OWEN, supra note 2, at 15-16. 
247 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 10, 7-8. 
248 All states, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, are required to follow the public acts, 
records, and judicial decisions of all other states. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1. 
249 See U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
250 See REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 100. 
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nism of the Commission, Council, and Parliament to propose, approve 
and issue directives.251 Member States can devise their own way of 
implementing the directives as long as the legislative bodies of the 
Member States meet a common objective.252 In the United States, of 
course, the state legislatures retain the discretion to accept, amend, or 
reject the uniform laws that the National Conference proposes.253 
Some issues are unique to the EC. Noncompliance is a problem in 
the mandatory system of the EC, while in the voluntary system of the 
United States, it is simply an issue of convenience for a large number 
of state legislatures to adopt the proposed uniform code.254 Also of 
concern in the EC is the issue of standing, which involves an examina-
tion of the direct and indirect effect, as well as the horizontal and 
vertical effect, of directives. 255 The principle of subsidiarity is similarly 
a unique concept in that the EC can take action only insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
Member States; consequently, by reason of the scale of the proposed 
action, the Community can better achieve its objectives.256 
While the EC has encountered numerous problems in the transposal 
of community legislation into national law, the inherent voluntary 
nature of the uniform codes, as previously discussed, prevents similar 
problems from arising in the United States.257 The proposed uniform 
codes are a recommendation from the National Conference to the 
state legislatures which are free to adopt the codes, in whatever form 
they choose, in order to harmonize the widely divergent laws of the 
various states. 258 In contrast, because EU directives are mandatory, 
Member States are required to enact new legislation unless they (1) 
can amend existing legislation or (2) prove that their existing legisla-
tion achieves the results to be accomplished by the directives.259 
The lack of harmonization of state laws within the United States was 
partially solved by the system of uniform acts created by the National 
251 See Davidson, supra note 54, at 105-06, 107-08. 
252 See EEC TREATY, art. 189. 
253 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 30-31. 
254 See id. 
255 See 9WEN, supra note 2, at 32. 
256 See TEU, art 3b. 
257 See A CENTURY OF SERVICE, supra note 23, at 3; see also REFERENCE BooK, supra note 26, at 
Record of Passage of Uniform and Model Acts as of September 30, 1997, appended on an 
unnumbered page. 
258 See id. 
259 See P.E. Morris, The Direct Effect of Directives-Some Recent Developments in the European 
Court,]. Bus. L. 233, 238, 244 (1989). 
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Conference, a private organization. Although many aspects of the 
system are cumbersome, the voluntary nature of the process does 
achieve a measure of uniformity. The EC has developed a secondary 
system of directives which allows it to achieve uniformity among the 
laws of its sovereign Member States. Although one system operates 
under a supranational institutional structure and issues mandatory 
directives, while the other is based on a federal constitutional system 
and has voluntary codes issued by a private organization, both meet 
the overall objective of harmonization. 
V. SUMMARY 
Businesses and private citizens alike encounter unnecessary difficul-
ties in their attempts to conduct their affairs across politically-drawn 
borders when they operate under conflicting laws governing similar 
transactions. Property rights, tort liability issues, commercial transac-
tions, marital status, and employment matters are a few examples 
illustrating how important it is for businesses and persons interacting 
within a geographic region to enjoy the predictability of similar laws. 
The EC operates under a series of treaties and uses directives with 
requirements to harmonize the laws among its independent nations. 
The United States adopted a constitutional system which has no pro-
visions to harmonize laws on matters that affect people doing business 
in several states. Originally structured by the American Bar Association, 
the National Conference provided a solution to harmonize laws among 
the states. Both the EC and the United States have adopted systems 
unique to their historical backgrounds to harmonize the laws of the 
region and to transpose proposals into legislation. Neither has 
achieved a perfect system, but both have achieved a relative degree of 
success. 
